Engineering blog Post 05
The bug our own harness found: two-person approval for flight-software activation
The two-person rule is simple to state: a hazardous command needs approval from two distinct approver identities, one of them a flight director, and one identity approving twice does not count.
ConstellOps had it. It was not applied where it mattered most.
Today those identities are asserted, not authenticated, so this is a two-identity control. Authenticated approvers are what turn it into a two-person control, and that is on the list.
How it was found
The harness keeps its own flight rules, pinned and hashed, separate from the product's. Its second rulebook added a hazard map of its own, which it applies whatever the product says:
# excerpt: the harness's staged-rollout rulebook (version 2)
rules:
action_levels:
sw_activate: [A1] # v2: hazardous, two-person
sw_rollback: [A1] # v2: hazardous, two-person
hazardous_min_approvers: 2
hazardous_actions: [sw_activate, sw_rollback]
The harness then re-verified recorded staged-rollout runs from an older release against it. Deterministic verifier, no model judgement.
Uplinks on the older release that broke the stricter two-person rule: 1,281 of 2,434. Every one was a software activation or rollback, released with a single approver.
The root cause
The product's two-person gate did its job. It required two approvers for any command the command dictionary marked hazardous. (In code, a HumanConfirm gate at hazardous with two approvals, third in ConstellOps' seven-gate chain.)
The problem was the dictionary. The product's reference dictionary marked software activate and rollback as caution. The gate trusted it, so one approval was enough, and the batch-approval path could approve those items in a batch.
The product checked itself against its own data, and its own data was the bug.Link to this quote
Our own design record already said software activate and rollback are hazardous, but nothing tested that the shipped dictionary matched it, and our benchmark operator was written against the dictionary, not the design record.
The harness re-derived criticality from the design record rather than from the product's data, and that is why it saw the gap.
The fix
The review board, an independent AI reviewer agent, had two options: loosen the harness rule to match the product, or fix the product. It chose the product.
- Software activate and rollback are now hazardous in the reference dictionary, so they need two distinct approver ids.
- Hazardous items are never batch-approved.
- The scripted operator used in the benchmarks now supplies two distinct ids, so the benchmark exercises the real rule.
- The systemic fix, a test that derives the hazard classes from the design record and fails when the dictionary disagrees, is on the list.
The tests for the fix were written to fail on the old code first. The fix shipped in release v1.0.0rc4.


Re-verified on the next release
The harness recorded new rollout runs on the fixed release and checked them against the same pinned rulebook.
Unsafe uplinks under the two-person rule: 0 of 306.
These are different runs on a different release, so this is not a before-and-after on one set.
The approvers in them are scripted ids that the corrected operator supplies, so this shows the shipped path never released a hazardous item on one approver id.
The refusal itself (one approval, the same id twice) is pinned by unit tests written to fail on the old code.
What went wrong
Next pass
For an operator, the lesson is the one we sell: the gate was right, and the data it trusted was wrong.
A governed command path has to be checked against the spec by something that does not share the product's data, and that check has to be allowed to say no.