Use case · Staged flight-software rollout
A bad build halts itself at the canary.
Canary first, then waves. A regression halts it; your approvers own rollback.
What this shows
Simulation. A new flight-software build goes to a small canary first. Each activation needs two different approvers. The canary comparator finds a regression and halts at once, every later wave stays blocked, and the rollback, also approved by two people, returns each exposed spacecraft to its previous build.Frequent releases. Fleet-wide blast radius.
Large fleets ship flight and ground software often, and a fleet-wide regression is a single point of failure.
The full picture
The discipline that protects a web service (staging, blast-radius limits, pre-deploy verification, fast rollback) is harder in orbit, where every upload waits for a contact window.
How ConstellOps handles it
- 01Plan
- 02Verify
- 03Upload by approval
- 04Halt automatically
- 05Roll back
Each step in full
- 01PlanThe release agent builds a canary cohort and waves from the fleet registry.
- 02VerifyThe build is checked against the digital twin before any upload. A build that fails is blocked.
- 03Upload by approvalCanary upload and each promotion are proposals approved by the Flight Director and uplinked in contact windows. Activation and rollback are hazardous commands: two distinct approvers.
- 04Halt automaticallyCanary health is compared with the fleet. On regression, the rollout halts before the next wave. The halt only stops promotion; it never uplinks a command on its own.
- 05Roll backRollback is proposed and approved like any other command.
Automatic in the safe direction only.
Autonomy level and approvals
Promotion and rollback are A1. The automatic halt is fail-safe: it can only stop a rollout, never advance one.
A bad build stopped after about five satellites.
Full results table and notes
20 staged rollouts of a build with a canary regression on ConstellOps v1.0.0rc4. No matched classical comparison exists for rollouts.
| Metric | ConstellOps |
|---|---|
| Bad-build rollouts halted before the full fleet | 20 of 20 |
| Canary wave size | 6 |
| Satellites on the bad build before the halt | 5 |
| Time from first install to halt | 0.45 h (about 27 min) |
| Rollouts where the bad build went beyond the canary | 0 of 20 |
| Unsafe uplinks, with two distinct approvers on every software activate and rollback | 0 of 306 |
| Runs that replay identically | 20 of 20 |
| Human sign-offs required per run (by policy; two-person actions count twice) | 27.4 |
See it in the operations console
What this shows
The canary comparator halts the build. The rollback is approved under two distinct approver ids and uplinked in contact windows.More console captures

What this shows
Before and after: the halt at the canary stage and the restored fleet after the gated rollback.
What this shows
The signed rollout_halted record: evidence, exposed spacecraft, record hash, previous hash and Ed25519 signature.What this shows
The rollout-halted decision record, written by the canary comparator: evidence, exposed spacecraft, and an integrity block with record hash, previous hash and Ed25519 signature.
What this shows
Rollback complete: every exposed spacecraft back on its previous build.
What this shows
The canary comparator has halted the rollout: regressed health metrics, later waves blocked, rollback proposed.
What this shows
Two-person rule, first approver: FD-1 types the target spacecraft ID to confirm approval 1 of 2.
What this shows
Two-person rule, second approver: 'FD-1 approved · needs a different operator'; OPS-ENG-A confirms approval 2 of 2.What this shows
Flight-software activation is hazardous: FD-1 approves first, then a different operator, OPS-ENG-A, types the spacecraft ID and gives the second approval. It is never batch-approved.What it is not
Not a build or signing system for flight software.
The limits, listed
- Not a build or signing system for flight software.
- Not autonomous promotion.



